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COMMENT
THE BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILD
DOCTRINE IN WISCONSIN CUSTODY
CASES
I. INTRODUCTION
The best interest of the child doctrine in custody and
adoption proceedings has long been hailed in Wisconsin as the
primary guide for any custody decision. The Wisconsin Su-
preme Court mentioned the doctrine as early as 1865: "But if
[the child] was of such tender years that he could not form a
proper judgment, the court would exercise its judgment for his
benefit, and do what it thought most for his interest and wel-
fare."' Such a devotion to the child's interest is, to the mod-
ern person, unquestionably laudable and well-placed. How-
ever, throughout the past 150 years, there have always been
preferences and presumptions in custody cases, favoring ei-
ther the father or the mother as against one another, or either
parent as against a third party. These preferences and pre-
sumptions, this Comment argues, sap the primacy of the best
interest of the child doctrine.
The scope of this Comment is quite narrow; it focuses
upon chapter 247,2 custody alone (as opposed to adoption)3 as
most often arises from divorce proceedings and limits itself to
an investigation of the two above-mentioned preferences and
presumptions. This Comment traces the history of parental
1. In re Stillman Goodenough, 19 Wis. 291, 296 (1865).
2. Wis. STAT. ch. 247 (1977), renumbered Wis. STAT. ch. 767 (1979). Chapter 247
was recently renumbered. Because virtually all of the case law regarding the custody
issue uses the ch. 247 designation, that statutory number will arise in much of the
discussion in this Comment.
3. Although this Comment applies to adoptions by analogy because the final test
in adoption proceedings is also the best interest of the child (see Wis. STAT.
§ 48.01.(2) (1977)), adoption proceedings are governed by Wis. STAT. ch. 48, not ch.
247 (767), Actions Affecting Marriage. Moreover, there have been some clarifying ad-
vances made in the best interest of the child rule in adoptions (e.g., Adoption of
Tachick, 60 Wis. 2d 540, 210 N.W.2d 865 (1973)) which similarly apply to ch. 247
custody cases by analogy, (e.g., Adoption of Randolph, 68 Wis. 2d 64, 227 N.W.2d 634
(1975)).
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preferences and presumptions in Wisconsin law to the present
day, argues that these are inconsonant with the best interest
doctrine as espoused by Wisconsin law, and concludes that
case law could gain consistency without losing any flexibility if
they were eliminated.
II. THE HUSBAND-WIFE PREFERENCE
A. The Father's Common Law Right
Since at least the Civil War, Wisconsin courts have noted
the best interest doctrine as at least an important factor or
element in deciding custody.4 However, throughout much of
the latter half of the 19th century, the "well settled doctrine
of the common law, that the father is entitled to the custody
of his minor children, as against the mother and everybody
else . . . vitiated any real effect of the child's best interest
upon custody. Clearly, such a preference for the father was
economically based and reflected a time, happily gone, when
children were valued for their contribution to the work force
and, consequently, the family board.
The primacy of the child's economic value is illustrated in
In re Stillman Goodenough.' There, the court found that an
eleven-year-old girl had been bound as an apprentice to a
third party through an invalid indenture. The child's mother
was, at that time, an inmate of the county poorhouse and the
father a convict in the state prison.7 Although the court fa-
vored the holder of the indenture over the father (given the
father's straitened circumstances), it made it clear that, in the
absence of any great deficiency on the father's part, he would
be entitled to custody. "That the father has a legal and para-
mount right to the custody and services of his child will not in
general be denied."8 Particularly telling was the court's refer-
ence to the "services" of the child. Even though the court in
this case paid lip service to the child's interest,9 the child-as-
4. See In re Stillman Goodenough, 19 Wis. 291 (1865).
5. Statp v. Richardson, 40 N.H. 272, 273 (1860).
6. 19 Wis. 291 (1865).
7. Id.
8. Id. at 295.
9. Id. at 296. "But if [the child] was of such tender years that he could not form a
proper judgment, the court would exercise its judgment for his benefit, and do what it
thought most for his interest and welfare."
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commodity concept, coupled with the statutory preference for
the father,10 demonstrated that any consideration for the
child's interest was, at best, secondary.
The earliest mention in Wisconsin of the best interest doc-
trine appears to have been in Welch v. Welch." There, the
court said that that "[t]he welfare of the children, and how
their interests will be best subserved, are the matters of pri-
mary consideration with the court, and [in] whatever order is
made respecting the care and custody of them, these should
constitute the governing motives of judicial action.' 1 2 While
the court, recognizing its own (and the trial court's) broad dis-
cretionary powers in such a decision,13 examined the child's
interest in light of the circumstances, it admitted that "[in
general, all other circumstances being equal, the paramount
common law right of the father to the children will be recog-
nized.114 This admission shows, however inadvertently, that
the best interest of the child consideration cannot have pri-
macy as long as there are parental rights (or, in more modern
time, presumptions or preferences) regarding custody. If the
father has, in the absence of unfitness, a common law right to
custody, the court must really decide a custody issue on the
basis of parental fitness, with the best interest of the child
relegated to the subordinate role of being merely a factor in
that decision.
The above cases demonstrate the tension between the
child's best interest and the father's right to custody. The ob-
vious question then becomes: What weight was given each?
Some guidance may be found in the statutes. The salient lan-
guage, unchanged from 1849 through 1919, was that the father
was entitled to custody if he were "competent to transact [his]
own business and not otherwise unsuitable."' 5 Where the
10. Wis. STAT. ch. 112, § 5 (1858):
The father of the minor, if living, and in case of his decease, the mother,
while she remains unmarried, being themselves respectively competent to
transact their own business, and not otherwise unsuitable, shall be entitled to
the custody of the person of the minor, and to the care of his education.
The essence remained virtually unchanged for 70 years.
11. 33 Wis. 534 (1873).
12. Id. at 542.
13. Id. at 541.
14. Id.
15. Wis. STAT. ch. 80, § 5 (1849); Wis. STAT. ch. 112, § 5 (1858); Wis. STAT. ch. 170,
1980]
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father's unsuitableness was patent, as in the aforementioned
In re Stillman Goodenough, then the child's best interest gov-
erned. But what if the father were not so patently unfit? In
such a case, it became difficult to see the role of the child's
interests.
B. The "Mother's Love" Theory
Although the statutory preference in favor of the father
was to linger until 1921,11 a contrary preference, at least as
strong and perhaps stronger, in favor of the mother began to
stir as early as the 1890's. An 1895 case, Johnston v. John-
ston,17 showed the kind of thinking that shifted custody con-
siderations from a common law right of the father to a prefer-
ence for the mother. In finding the father unfit on the bases of
dissipation, infidelity, and lack of means, the court granted
custody to the child's mother although it acknowledged that
the mother was of slender means; had, on occasion, directed
"violent and profane language' 18 toward her husband; and
was herself raised by a mother "of coarse and vulgar speech
and conduct, whose presence and example might exert an un-
favorable influence upon the children if they were permitted
to remain at the home of the [mother's] father."' 9 In so hold-
ing, the court said: "Strong natural affection of a devoted
mother living an industrious and reputable life, though she be
in straitened circumstances, is a very sufficient assurance that
she will tenderly care for and properly nurture and educate
her children." 20
Such a holding is perhaps not at all inconsonant with the
children's best interests. Yet the court went on to disallow
custody to the children's paternal grandfather, a "man of am-
§ 3964 (1898); Wis. STAT. ch. 170, § 3964 (1919).
16. Wis. STAT. ch. 170, § 3964 (1921) provides in part:
The father and mother of the minor, if living together, and if living apart
then either as the court may determine for the best interests of the minor, and
in case of the death of either parent the survivor thereof, being themselves
respectively competent to transact their own business and not otherwise un-
suitable, shall be entitled to the custody of the person of the minor, and to the
care of his education.
17. 89 Wis. 416, 62 N.W. 181 (1895).
18. Id. at 419, 62 N.W. at 182.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 420, 62 N.W. at 182.
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ple means, ' who was "evidently attached to the children,
and has done much for their care and support in the past and
would doubtless continue to do so in the future . . . by
holding that "the mother is not to be deprived of [the chil-
dren's] care and custody, or the children of the companion-
ship and maternal affection of their mother, because some
wealthy relative is willing to take them and give them better
advantages in life than those to which they were born."23
While this case is admittedly archaic, it does serve to show
that the best interest of the child consideration, in spite of
language to the contrary, is a subsidiary consideration as long
as there is a governing preference.
Rhetoric not dissimilar to, that in Johnston v. Johnston
may be found in Jenkins v. Jenkins;24 language from this case
has been often cited by the Wisconsin court and is probably
the hallmark of what might be termed the "tender years" or
"mother's love" preference, which, for a time, often seemed to
be irrebuttable. In this case, the wife had temporary custody
of the youngest son while the husband had temporary custody
of the elder two sons. The circumstances of each parent were
roughly equal.25 Although the court mentioned that the best
interests of the children might be served by keeping the three
boys together,26 it appears to have made its determination on
the basis of a subsuming notion of motherly love:
For a boy of such tender years nothing can be an adequate
substitute for mother love-for that constant ministration
required during the period of nurture that only a mother
can give because in her alone is duty swallowed up in desire;
in her alone is service expressed in terms of love. She alone
has the patience and sympathy required to mold and soothe
the infant mind in its adjustment to its environment. The
difference between fatherhood and motherhood in this re-
spect is fundamental and the law should recognize it unless
offset by undesirable traits in the mother. Here we have
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. 173 Wis. 592, 181 N.W. 826 (1921).
25. See id. at 594-95, 181 N.W. at 826.
26. Id. at 593, 181 N.W. at 826.
1980]
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none so far as mother love is concerned.2 7
Not surprisingly, the court granted custody of all three boys
to their mother.
Once again, we can see that the best interest of the child is
held up as paramount, but is really not the final arbiter. And
lest it be thought that the sentiments of the court are no
longer applicable, it must be noted that the above quote from
Jenkins has been often reiterated by the court, as recently as
1975.28
A relatively recent case, Templeton v. Templeton,28 makes
the tension between best interest of the child and the
"mother's love" preference absolutely lucid. The court de-
clared that "as stated in the brief of the defendant, the con-
trolling consideration in all custody matters is the welfare of
the child."30 However, the court conditioned the best interest
of the child solely upon the fitness of the plaintiff mother as a
parent and, to determine the mother's fitness, searched
strictly for neglect and failure of duty to the child. 1 To so
restrict the best interest test to the question of maternal
fitness is to say that a child's best interest is inevitably served
as long as its mother is anything but unfit. As contradictory
and simplistic as this may sound, it was nevertheless to be the
rule in Wisconsin until a statutory change in 1971.32
C. The "Mother's Love" Preference As An "'Element"
Prior to 1971, the Wisconsin Statutes regarding custody
following divorce indicated only that the "court may make
such further provisions therein as it deems just and reasona-
ble concerning the care, custody, maintenance and education
27. Id. at 595, 181 N.W. at 827.
28. E.g., Acheson v. Acheson, 235 Wis. 610, 614, 294 N.W. 6, 8 (1940); Peterson v.
Peterson, 13 Wis. 2d 26, 30, 108 N.W.2d 126, 128 (1961); Scolman v. Scolman, 66 Wis.
2d 761, 768, 226 N.W.2d 388, 391 (1975).
29. 254 Wis. 92, 35 N.W.2d 223 (1948).
30. Id. at 93, 35 N.W.2d at 224.
31. See id. at 94, 35 N.W.2d at 224.
32. 1971 Wis. Laws ch. 157, § 2 states that § 247.24(3) of the statutes is created to
read: "In determining the parent with whom a child shall remain, the court shall
consider all facts in the best interest of the child and shall not prefer one parent over
the other solely on the basis of the sex of the parent." § 247.24(3) has been renum-
bered § 767.24(3).
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of the minor children. . . ."s The primacy of the child's best
interest and the preference for the mother (all other things
being equal) were strictly case law elements, yet they were
most influential. However, chapter 157 of the 1971 Laws of
Wisconsin, which amended Wisconsin Statute 247.24, dealt
explicitly with both.3 4 For the first time, the best interest doc-
trine as a paramount consideration was given statutory au-
thority; at the same time, the amendment eliminated any pa-
rental preference based on sex.
Although some felt at the time that this amendment would
result in a marked substantive change in policy, 5 time has
shown that, at least as far as maternal preference is con-
cerned, the court's stand does not appear to have changed al-
together. In Scolman v. Scolman,3s the court brought back in
through the back door what the legislature had just thrown
out the front. There, following a divorce proceeding, the cus-
tody of a six-and-one-half-year-old boy was in question. The
trial court granted custody to the mother (although the evi-
dence may be understood to indicate that the father would
have had greater resources and more time to spend with his
son) 7 apparently on the sole ground of her being the mother.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed, finding that, since
the 1971 amendment of section 247.24, currently numbered
767.24, there is no longer a strong preference in favor of the
mother, and further, that any decision must be "based on
precise findings that such placement is in the best interests of
the child."3 8 Had the court stopped there, it would have ap-
peared that, for once, some real attention was being paid to
the best interest of a particular child, by requiring the trier of
fact to "make a personal evaluation of this mother's qualities
and weigh them against those of this father." 9 However, the
33. Wis. STAT. § 247.24 (1969).
34. 1971 Wis. Laws ch. 157.
35. Podell, Peck & First, Custody-To Which Parent, 56 MARQ. L. REv. 51, 51-
54 (1972).
36. 66 Wis. 2d 761, 226 N.W.2d 388 (1975).
37. Id. at 764-65, 226 N.W.2d at 389-90.
38. Id. at 767, 226 N.W.2d at 391.
39. Id.
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court went on to resurrect the florid prose of Jenkins v. Jen-
kins40 on motherly love, and concluded that
sec. 247.24(3), Stats., does not strike down the holdings of
this court indicating that, other things being equal, there is
usually a preference for the mother. . . .The statute merely
decrees what the law in Wisconsin is already, that the trial
court's decision cannot solely be based on the sex of the
parent.41
The court cited with approval three Minnesota cases, all
based on statutory language identical to that in section
247.24,42 currently 767.24. The most recent of these, Erickson
v. Erickson'3 held that the statute4 "should not give the
mother an 'absolute or arbitrary preference' on the basis of
her sex."'45 This last comment raises a difficult problem: What
is the quality of any preference of the mother, if all other
things are equal? The Minnesota quote appears to make it
something just short of an irrebuttable presumption, or at
least to allow it to be understood as such. Independent lan-
guage in the Scolman decision appears to put Wisconsin's test
in the same category. 4e It might be argued that the Wisconsin
court answered the question when it said: "The preference to
be given to a mother in the award of custody of a minor child
is only one element to be considered.' 47 This would mean that
the court is asserting that there is no preference of any sort in
favor of the mother, but that there is a permissible element or
factor to be considered. This distinction, however, raises its
own problems and questions.
40. 173 Wis. at 595, 181 N.W. at 827.
41. 66 Wis. 2d at 766, 226 N.W.2d at 390.
42. See Petersen v. Petersen, 296 Minn. 147, 206 N.W.2d 658 (1973); Ryg v.
Kerkow, 296 Minn. 265, 207 N.W.2d 701 (1973); Erickson v. Erickson, 300 Minn. 559,
220 N.W.2d 487 (1974).
43. 300 Minn. 559, 220 N.W.2d 487 (1974).
44. MINN. STAT. § 518.17 (1971).
45. Scolman v. Scolman, 66 Wis. 2d 761, 767, 226 N.W.2d 388, 391 (1975) citing
Erickson v. Erickson, 300 Minn. 559, -, 220 N.W.2d 487, 489 (1974).
46. "[Tjhe trial court's decision cannot solely be based on the sex of the parent.
Our interpretation is consistent with [that of] the Minnesota Supreme Court. .
Scohnan v. Scolman, 66 Wis. 2d 761, 766, 226 N.W.2d 388, 390 (1975).
47. Id. at 767, 226 N.W.2d at 391 (italics supplied).
[Vol. 64:343
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III. PREFERENCES, PRESUMPTIONS AND ELEMENTS
Perhaps it would be wise at this point to make some clear
linguistic distinctions. Since parental custody is so obviously a
balancing test between husband and wife, let us adopt the
scale or balance as the operative extended metaphor for a cus-
tody decision, with each side representing a party. Evidence in
favor of a particular party weighs down the appropriate side
of the balance; whichever side is heavier wins. And here, since
the avowed "paramount consideration" is the best interest of
the child, each bit of weight would be an element or factor
contributing to that end. Now, a hypothetical "element" or
"factor" might be "financial stability" or "earning capacity"
or "ability to contribute to a child's physical welfare." In the
application of any such element,it is clear that either father
or mother could avail himself or herself of this element; it is
simply contingent on who makes or saves or could make or
save more money and upon his or her ability to demonstrate
such to the court. But note that the one who would use such a
factor or element in his or her behalf must make a positive
showing that it applies to his or her position.
However, if we consider the Scolman court's labeling of
the "mother's love" preference as an "element," we find a cer-
tain logical inconsistency. An element or factor, as defined
above, is neutral in that it could be utilized by either party to
a custody action. But the preference in favor of the mother
obviously cannot be used by the father. A preference of this
sort is much more in the nature of a rebuttable presumption
than a factor. It places upon the father the burden, ab initio,
of demonstrating either that the mother is unfit or that the
father is equally capable of providing the care that an ideal
mother would be expected to provide. In any case, this prefer-
ence suggests that the balance may be tilted toward the
mother from the start.
Curiously, the Scolman court recognized this problem, ac-
knowledged it to be a problem, but took inadequate steps to
correct it. The court, in referring to the trial court's reflexive
preference for the mother, stated that "[a] review of the re-
cord here clearly indicates that the trial court transformed a
slight preference for the mother into an almost irrebuttable
1980]
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presumption in favor of the mother. '4 Clearly, the court rec-
ognized the danger implicit within the preference; neverthe-
less, it refused to completely discard it.
The inconsistency, then, is obvious if we return to the scale
metaphor. If the sides of the balance are empty when the par-
ties to a custody action enter the courtroom, to be filled only
when husband or wife present factors in each one's favor, then
when does the preference for the mother enter into the bal-
ance? The Scolman court addressed this question by stating
that "other things being equal, preference will ordinarily be
given to the mother if she is not unfit. '' 4 Logically, this sug-
gests that the preference ought to be applied only as a kind of
judicial tiebreaker, that is, in the event that the evidence
shows both mother and father to be equally capable of caring
for the child, or more importantly, when the child's best inter-
est could be served equally well by either parent. But the
court is not clear in setting forth such a limited use of the
presumption. In fact, the following Scolman language indi-
cates that the factor might justifiably be applied at any time:
"The preference to be given to a mother in the award of cus-
tody of a minor child is only one element to be considered."50
Thus, presumably, the trial judge need not wait for the evi-
dence in order to give the mother an advantage.
Hence, if preferences are allowed for purposes of custody,
the sides of the balance are, ab initio, not necessarily equal. If,
as Scolman asserts, it is permissible for the trier of fact to
assume that "other things being equal, there is usually a pref-
erence for the mother,"'51 then the father clearly has a greater
burden of proof. Moreover, dicta in the opinion"' suggests that
the preference may be quite strong; hence, the father's burden
will be all that much greater.
Finally, it must be said that, given the Scolman court's
discussion of a particular mother's love as weighed against the
particular father's love,53 one might argue that the court really
meant to reduce the presumption to a true factor or element;
48. Id. at 764, 226 N.W.2d at 389.
49. Id., quoting Belisle v. Belisle, 27 Wis. 2d 317, 322, 134 N.W.2d 491, 494 (1965).
50. Id. at 767, 226 N.W.2d at 391.
51. Id. at 766, 226 N.W.2d at 390.
52. Id. at 766-67, 226 N.W.2d at 390-91.
53. Id. at 767, 226 N.W.2d at 390-91.
[Vol. 64:343
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that is, that henceforth, the particular mother's love will be
put in one side of the balance and the particular father's love
in the other. However, considering the other above-mentioned
rhetoric used by the court," the inclusion of the Jenkins
court's paean to mother love,55 the absence of any such praise
for a father's love, and the half-century history of a quasi-pre-
sumption in favor of the mother, such an argument is not at
all persuasive.
IV. THE PARENT-THIRD PARTY PRESUMPTION
The previous discussion points to the conclusion that
what is being measured by the courts is not the best interest
of the child, but the best interest of the parent. This is even
clearer when we examine the presumption which operates
when a custody battle arises not between mother and father,
but between parent and third party. In early Wisconsin case
history, the presumption in favor of the parent as against a
third party is certainly as strong as, if not stronger than, the
preferences already discussed. The 1895 Johnston v. John-
ston56 case, mentioned earlier, shows that, in spite of the ad-
mitted advantages which the grandfather could provide for
the children, "the mother is not to be deprived of [the chil-
dren's] care and custody. . . ...' The language chosen by the
court demonstrates that children were little more than chat-
tels; advantages which would seem to be in their best interest
were withheld from them if a parent were to press his or her
right to custody.
A case of the same vintage, Markwell v. Pereles,58 ilus-
trates this pre-emptive parental right. Upon the death of her
mother, the infant girl in question was turned over to her aunt
and uncle by her father. Nearly two years later, the father
sought to take the child back, but was refused, and a court
battle ensued. While there was no evidence that the aunt and
uncle were in any way unfit or unsuitable,59 the record was
clear on the father's deficiencies:
54. Id. at 766-67, 226 N.W.2d at 390-91.
55. Id. at 768, 226 N.W.2d at 391.
56. 89 Wis. 416, 62 N.W. 181 (1895).
57. Id. at 420, 62 N.W. at 182.
58. 95 Wis. 406, 69 N.W. 798 (1897).
59. See id. at 407-08, 69 N.W. at 798.
1980]
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[H]e is of a somewhat cold, reserved, and unsympathetic
nature, rather than warm hearted and affectionate, and has
never exhibited much love or affection for said child; that he
is a traveling salesman by occupation,.. . and in the course
of his business must be absent from his home a great part of
his time.60
Nevertheless, the court granted custody to the father, cit-
ing and agreeing with the position taken in prior English cus-
tody cases,"' that, generally, custody should be withheld from
the father only if he is in such a position "as to render it not
merely better for the children, but essential to their safety or
to their welfare, in some very serious and important respect,
that his rights should be treated as lost or suspended." 2 Hap-
pily, modern results are not quite as severe.
In these cases, where most frequently the dispute is be-
tween one parent (the other parent having little or no interest
in custody) and a third party (often foster parents or a rela-
tive who has had custody for some time), recent Wisconsin
case law is not particularly clear. The statute on custody 63
treats this situation differently than it does the usual hus-
band-wife custody battle. Where a third party is involved, the
test is "[i]f the interest of any child demands it, and if the
court finds either that the parents are unable to care for such
children adequately or are not fit and proper persons to have
the care and custody [thereof] . . . ". Hence, it would ap-
pear that in these cases, the best interest of the child is not
absolutely paramount. Case law, however, has not always
given such a plain meaning to the statute, as the following
four cases illustrate.
Dees v. Dees6 5 involved a divorce action wherein both par-
ties stipulated to the placing of their child in a foster home.
Two years later, the mother sought a change of custody to
herself. She had had, however, during and after the marriage,
a history of severe emotional problems.6 The trial court did
60. Id. at 415, 69 N.W. at 801.
61. Id. at 417, 69 N.W. at 801.
62. Id.
63. Wis. STAT. § 247.24 (1977), renumbered Wis. STAT. § 767.24 (1979).
64. Wis. STAT. § 247.24(1)(c) (1977), renumbered Wis. STAT. § 767.24(1)(c) (1979).
65. 41 Wis. 2d 435, 164 N.W.2d 282 (1969).
66. Id. at 439, 164 N.W.2d at 284.
[Vol. 64:343
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not find her unfit per se but found that she was unable to
adequately care for the child; hence, the trial court denied her
petition.67 The Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed, holding
that the best interest of the child required a guardian ad litem
to aid the trial court in its decision."' In its opinion, the court
discussed the statutory language as follows:
In this state, where the primary and controlling considera-
tion is what will be best for the child [the distinction be-
tween "unfitness" and "inability to adequately provide
care"] is not as crucial because in this state the would-be
custodian must establish not only fitness and ability to pro-
vide adequate care but also that his or her being awarded
custody would be in the best interests of the child.69
This reasoning, however, transforms what appears to be a
clear statutory presumption in favor of the parent as against
nonparents into a test additional to that of best interest. But
whether viewed as a presumption or as a test, the statutory
provision does modify the primacy of the best interest of the
child, in spite of language in the opinion, quoted from Welker
v. Welker,7 that "the polestar remains the welfare of the
child."71
A 1972 case, Ponsford v. Crute7 2 appears to construe the
language of the statute as creating a presumption in favor of
the parent. The mother, who lived with her parents, had cus-
tody of the child following the couple's separation. While the
father was in the armed forces, the mother died in an acci-
dent. Her parents took care of the child for more than a year,
at which time, the father, having remarried, sought custody.
An initial habeas corpus proceeding held in favor of the
grandparents, finding that the husband was not "suitable"
and that the best interests of the child were served by her
staying with her grandparents.73 But the trial court in the cus-
tody proceeding found in favor of the father.7 4 The Wisconsin
67. Id. at 438-39, 164 N.W.2d at 284.
68. Id. at 443-44, 164 N.W.2d at 286.
69. Id. at 440, 164 N.W.2d at 285.
70. 24 Wis. 2d 570, 578, 129 N.W.2d 134, 139 (1964).
71. 41 Wis. 2d at 443, 164 N.W.2d at 286.
72. 56 Wis. 2d 407, 202 N.W.2d 5 (1972).
73. Id. at 410, 202 N.W.2d at 6.
74. Id. at 411, 202 N.W.2d at 7.
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Supreme Court affirmed this judgment, and in doing so, im-
plied that, with respect to parent-third party actions, the stat-
ute mandates that the best interest of the child is not the sole
consideration; that the father "cannot be deprived of the cus-
tody of his minor child unless there is a finding that either he
is unfit or is unable to care for the child." 5 Regardless of the
policy behind it, this seems to be a more direct reading of the
statute and therefore at odds with the interpretation adopted
in Dees.
In a third case, Kurz v. Kurz,76 the court attempted to re-
solve the discrepancy between Ponsford and Dees, but with
little success. This case involved a divorce judgment where
both parents were found to be unfit persons for custody pur-
poses.77 Custody was granted to the paternal grandparents,
with whom the child and father then lived for two years, at
the end of which time the mother sought custody, claiming
she had been cured of her adulterous and emotionally dis-
turbed tendencies. ' She argued that the Ponsford interpreta-
tion overruled Dees, and therefore, no showing of the best in-
terest of the child was required in order for her to regain
custody, that she need only prove she was no longer unfit in
order for custody to automatically revert to her.
For whatever reason, the court in Kurz refused to hold
that Ponsford overruled Dees. In lengthy discussions of each,
the two cases were distinguished in that Dees was a custody
action arising from a divorce under section 247.24,80 while
Ponsford was a custody action brought by a surviving spouse
under section 247.05(4).81 The problem with this distinction is
that section 247.05 was the jurisdictional statute for all ac-
tions affecting marriage, including divorce.8 2 Moreover, sec-
75. Id. at 413, 202 N.W.2d at 8.
76. 62 Wis. 2d 677, 215 N.W.2d 555 (1974).
77. Id. at 679, 215 N.W.2d at 556.
78. Id. at 679-80, 215 N.W.2d at 556.
79. Id. at 683, 215 N.W.2d at 558.
80. Id. at 682, 215 N.W.2d at 558.
81. Id. at 684, 215 N.W.2d at 559. Section 247.05(4) has been renumbered
§ 767.05(2).
82. Wis. STAT. § 247.045 (1971) stated:
In any action for an annulment, divorce, legal separation, or otherwise af-
fecting marriage, when the court has reason for special concern as to the future
welfare of the minor children, the court shall appoint a guardian ad litem to
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tion 247.05(4), the statute under which Ponsford was brought,
was technically the same section which governed, jurisdiction-
ally, divorce custody cases:
(4) ACTIONS FOR CUSTODY OF CHILDREN. The question of a
child's custody may be determined as an incident of any ac-
tion properly commenced under sub. (1), (2) or (3); or under
s. 247.055, or an independent action for custody may be
commenced in any county of this state in which the child is
present.83
The last clause above governs Ponsford, but subsection (3),
mentioned within the statute, governs Dees.84 Therefore, it
appears that this is a distinction without a difference, espe-
cially since the substantive legal standards governing the
Ponsford "independent action for custody" are the very ones
set forth in 247.24, the statute governing Dees, since that stat-
ute provides the only applicable standards in the entire
chapter.
A. recent statement on the subject may be found in
LaChapell v. Mawhinney,"5 in which the literal reading taken
represent such children. If a guardian ad litem is appointed, the court shall
direct either or both parties to pay the fee of the guardian ad [item, the
amount of which fee shall be approved by the court. In the event of indigency
on the part of both parties the court, in its discretion, may direct that the fee
of the guardian ad litem be paid by the county of venue.
This section is now numbered § 767.045.
83. Wis. STAT. § 247.05(4) (1971). This is currently covered in Wis. STAT. §
767.05(2) (1979), which is phrased differently, but not so as to affect the outcome
here:
(2) ACTIONS FOR CUSTODY OF CHILDREN. Subject to ch. 822, the question of a
child's custody may be determined as an incident of any action affecting mar-
riage or in an independent action for custody. The effect of any determination
of a child's custody shall not be binding personally against any parent or
guardian unless the parent or guardian has been made personally subject to
the jurisdiction of the court in the action as provided under ch. 801 or has been
notified under s. 822.05 as provided in s. 822.12. Nothing in this section may be
construed to foreclose a person other than a parent who has physical custody
of a child from proceeding under ch. 822.
84. Wis. STAT. § 247.05(3) (1971) read as follows:
(3) ACTIONS BY OR AGAINST RESIDENTS FOR DIVORCE. Regardless of where the
cause of action arose, an action for divorce by or against a person who has been
a bona fide resident of this state for at least 6 months next preceding the com-
mencement of the action shall be commenced in the county of this state in
which at least one of the parties has been a bona fide resident for not less than
30 days next preceding the commmencment of the action.
85. 66 Wis. 2d 679, 225 N.W.2d 501 (1975).
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in Ponsford is considerably mollified. There, after the divorce,
custody was given to the mother, who died eight years later.
At that time, the maternal grandparents, who had assisted in
the "personal and financial care" 86 of the children since the
divorce, sought custody, as did the father. The trial court
found for the father, believing that the Ponsford rule required
such, in the absence of a showing of the father's unfitness . 7
But the Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed, holding that
[the] conclusion reached by this court in Ponsford should
not be interpreted as laying down an inflexible rule, that in
every case involving a dispute between the natural father or
mother and grandparents for the custody of the children,
the doctrine of the best interests of the children cannot
prevail.8s
Arguably, however, the above statement is a direct contradic-
tion of the Ponsford rule."9 The court further undercut the
Ponsford holding (and section 247.24) by saying: "As a general
matter, but not invariably, the child's best interest will be
served by living in a parent's home. However, if circumstances
compel a contrary conclusion, the interests of the child, not a
supposed right of even a fit parent to have custody, should
control." 90
V. CONCLUSION
With the LaChapell interpretation of the Ponsford rule
(and hence the statute), we have now reached a position
analagous to and as awkward as that reached by Scolman re-
garding husband-wife custody disputes. In each situation,
86. Id. at 681, 225 N.W.2d at 502.
87. Id. at 683, 225 N.W.2d at 503.
88. Id.
89. In Ponsford the court stated:
From the statute and this court's construction of it in Sommers v. Som-
mers, supra, as between Dale, the natural father, and the Crutes, the maternal
grandparents, Dale cannot be deprived of the custody of his minor child unless
there is a finding that either he is unfit or is unable to care for the child. The
court affirmatively found that as of the time of the trial in this case Dale was
fit to have the child and that he was able to adequately take care of her. Under
these findings the trial court was obligated to award the custody of Kim to the
father, Dale.
56 Wis. 2d 407, 413, 202 N.W.2d 5, 8 (1972) (footnote omitted).
90. 66 Wis. 2d at 683, 225 N.W.2d at 503.
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there is a presumption or preference which weakens the pri-
macy of the best interest of the child rule. In a Scolman hus-
band-wife dispute, the court took a strong preference created
by years of case law precedent, asserted that it is no longer a
strong preference, declared the primacy of the best interest of
the child doctrine, but then relegitimated the preference by
holding that it may still be a valid element. In a Pons ford-
LaChapell parent-third party dispute, the court took a statu-
tory presumption (which appears from its language to be ir-
rebuttable assuming no parental unfitness),9 1 asserted that it
is no longer irrebuttable, declared the primacy of the best in-
terest of the child doctrine, but, by implication, still allowed
the presumption to exist.
By this time, it should be clear that a combination of a
doctrine declared to be absolutely governing and a presump-
tion or preference which weakeng that doctrine can only lead
to a morass of muddled rationalizations. Ironically, all of the
decisions reached could have been achieved without the impo-
sition of any presumptions or preferences at all. Given the
rhetoric found in each case which praises the best interest
doctrine, such could easily have been the sole rule in each case
without disturbing the result. Eliminating the presumptions
and preferences and giving real credence to the best interest
rule may not add to the substance of custody law, but it
would serve to rid the law of an unnecessary stumbling block,
to promote a clarity of language in both trial court and appel-
late decisions, and perhaps to foster closer examination of the
particular circumstances in any given case; an approach which
common sense dictates as the most sound.
Implementing this change would be simple, but would re-
quire different methods for each of the situations discussed.
The husband-wife presumption, since it arose out of case law,
may certainly be disposed of in the same way; a clearer state-
ment of policy than can be found in Scolman would serve
nicely. To do so would in no way prevent a trier of fact from
taking a particular mother's love and care into account; it
91. "As a consequence, before a trial court can deprive the natural parents of cus-
tody, there must be findings supported by the evidence sufficient to show that both
natural parents are either unfit or unable to adequately care for the children." Pons-
ford v. Crute, 56 Wis. 2d 407, 413, 202 N.W.2d 5, 8 (1972), quoting Sommers v. Som-
mers, 33 Wis. 2d 22, 26, 146 N.W.2d 428, 430 (1966).
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would only preclude him from assuming a priori that a
mother's love is superior to that of a father.
The parent-third party presumption is statutory and
therefore can only be eliminated by the legislature. Once
again, to do so is not in any way to preclude a trial court from
finding that a particular parent should have custody as
against a third party, given the best interest of the child. Nor
would it invite abuse by random third parties, since it would
not likely be in the child's best interest to grant custody to
those not intimately connected with the child, whether by
blood or by long-standing devotion.
RONALD R. HOFER
